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"Race Coding" and White Opposition to Welfare

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Crime and welfare are now widely viewed as "coded" issues that activate white Americans' negative views of blacks without explicitly raising the "race card." But does the desire of whites to combat crime or curtail welfare really stem from their dislike of blacks? Are these not pressing problems about which Americans rightly should be concerned—apart from any associations these issues may have with race? In this paper I assess the extent to which white Americans' opposition to welfare is rooted in their attitudes toward blacks. Using conventional survey modeling techniques and a randomized survey-based experiment from a national telephone survey, I find that racial attitudes are the single most important influence on whites' welfare views. I also show that whites hold similar views of comparably described black and white welfare mothers, but that negative views of black welfare mothers are more politically potent, generating greater opposition to welfare than comparable views of white welfare mothers.

Political issues such as crime and welfare are now widely viewed as "coded" issues that play upon race (or, more specifically, upon white Americans' negative views of blacks) without explicitly raising the "race card" (Edsall and Edsall 1991, Jamieson 1992). Many believe that by engaging such issues, politicians can exploit whites' racial animosity and resentment while diminishing the appearance of race baiting. In the Willie Horton advertisement from the 1988 presidential campaign, for example, a pro-Bush political action committee used a black rapist and murderer who had been granted a weekend pass from a Massachusetts prison to symbolize Michael Dukakis's supposed softness on crime. Ostensibly, the focus of this ad was crime and what should be done about it; ineluctably, however, the subtext was race.

But does whites' desire to get tough on crime or their opposition to welfare really stem from their dislike of blacks? Are crime and welfare not pressing problems about which Americans rightly should be concerned, quite apart from any associations these issues may have with race? Welfare, crime, drugs, immigration policy, and other implicitly racial issues all have compelling claims on our attention irrespective of their racial connections, yet each is also undeniably shaped by race. Therefore, it is unlikely either that race plays no role in public thinking about these issues or that any of them represent simply racial politics in disguise. The question, then, is how important are racial considerations in the public's evaluation of race coded issues.

Surprisingly, we have little evidence to date with which to answer this question. Social scientists have produced a huge body of research on U.S. racial attitudes and their effect on explicitly racial policies, such as school busing, open housing laws, and affirmative action (e.g., Bobo 1983, 1988; McClendon 1985; Schuman and Bobo 1988; Sears 1988; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto 1992; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick 1991), as well as on broad political orientations, such as party identification (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989, Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). But academics have thus far paid little attention to the influence of racial attitudes on support for ostensibly race-neutral policies dealing with issues such as crime and welfare.

In this article I show that whites' welfare attitudes are indeed strongly influenced by their views of blacks. Using conventional structural models of welfare views, I find that the perception that blacks are lazy has a larger effect on white Americans' welfare policy preferences than does economic self-interest, beliefs about individualism, or views about the poor in general. Then, using a randomized survey-based experiment with identical questions about whites' perceptions of black and white welfare recipients, I show that perceptions of poor blacks are more strongly related to overall evaluations of welfare than are perceptions of poor whites. Finally, I identify the precise source of the greater predictive power of perceptions of poor blacks, showing that neutral or positive views of black and white welfare mothers have similar influence on welfare attitudes, but that negative views of black welfare recipients generate greater opposition to welfare than do negative views of white welfare recipients. In sum, although elite debate is predominately cast in race-neutral language, the white public's thinking about welfare is inordinately shaped by highly salient negative perceptions of blacks.

ATTITUDES TOWARD WELFARE

The U.S. welfare state contains a wide array of programs that supply a variety of benefits to diverse groups. Not surprisingly, surveys show dramatic differences in the public's evaluations of the various components of the welfare state. Education, health care, and benefits for the elderly receive nearly unanimous support among the U.S. public, as do programs that are seen as enhancing self-sufficiency (Cook 1979, Heclo 1986, Jaffe 1978). But support often turns to ambivalence or opposition when benefits are limited to the poor and provide direct cash or in-kind transfers. Programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), General Assistance,

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and Food Stamps, all of which offer assistance directly to poor families and individuals, are the least popular components of the U.S. welfare state (Shapiro and others 1987, Smith 1987).

These means-tested transfer programs, often referred to simply as "welfare," represent only a small fraction of social welfare spending,[1] and they raise fewer people out of poverty than do such social insurance programs as Social Security and Unemployment Insurance (Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey 1990). Nevertheless, both public thinking and elite debates over government antipoverty policy focus disproportionately on these means-tested programs. In this article the term *welfare* is used in this narrow sense, to refer to means-tested transfer programs that provide benefits directly to individuals.

SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO WELFARE

Previous efforts to explain Americans' opposition to welfare often have pointed to the economic self-interest of middle-class taxpayers. From this perspective, support for welfare is more likely to be found among lower income Americans who are welfare recipients, who have friends or family receiving welfare, or who envision the possibility of needing welfare in the future. Greater opposition to welfare is more likely among middle- and high-income taxpayers, who resist paying taxes for programs from which they do not expect to benefit.

The economic self-interest explanation is widely assumed to be true, and debates over public policy often rest on the assumption that the middle class resents paying for programs that benefit only the poor (e.g., Jencks 1992; Skocpol 1990, 1991). This explanation for opposition to welfare is intuitively plausible and is bolstered by survey analyses showing that support for welfare is greatest among the least well off (AuClaire 1984, Cook and Barrett 1992, Curtin and Cowan 1975, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Kluegel and Smith 1986, Williamson 1974). But this research also shows that the association of economic status and welfare attitudes is quite modest; many poor Americans oppose welfare, and many who are well off support it, despite their apparent self-interest in cutting welfare spending.[2]

The second widespread explanation for opposition to welfare focuses on individualism. A belief in personal effort and responsibility, and a suspicion of government, have long been viewed as dominant elements of American political culture (Tocqueville 1969 [1835], Hartz 1955, Lipset 1979, McClosky and Zaller 1984, Williams 1956). Along with self-interest, the "culture of individualism" account of antiwelfare sentiment figures prominently in policy debates (e.g., Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey 1990, Mead 1986). Once again, this popular belief has received support from surveys of public attitudes. In a nuanced study of individualism and the welfare state, Feldman and Zaller (1992) argue that individualist values constitute the most common ideological orientation upon which Americans draw in thinking about social welfare. The analysis by Feldman and Zaller is consistent with that of other researchers who have found that respondents with a greater commitment to individualist beliefs express greater opposition to welfare (Feagin 1975, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Kluegel and Smith 1986, Williamson 1974).

In contrast to the attention devoted to economic self-interest and individualism, racial attitudes have been largely neglected in prior studies of welfare views. Most research, including some of the most recent and ambitious analyses, has completely omitted racial attitudes from models of welfare support (Alston and Dean 1972, AuClaire 1984, Cook and Barrett 1992, Curtin and Cowan 1975, Feagin 1975, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Williamson 1974).[3] Evidence has begun to accumulate, however, that indicates the importance of racial attitudes in shaping opposition to welfare. A number of studies provide hints at this association (Kluegel and Smith 1986, Sears and Citrin 1985, Smith 1987), but they were not designed specifically to assess the influence of racial attitudes on welfare views and in this regard suffer from a variety of shortcomings (see Gilens 1995b for a more detailed discussion of this literature).[4]

More recently, I explicitly set out to assess the importance of whites' racial attitudes in shaping opposition to welfare (Gilens 1995b). This analysis showed that the dimension of racial attitudes with the strongest effect on welfare views is the extent to which blacks are perceived as lazy, and this perception is a better predictor of welfare attitudes than such alternatives as economic self-interest, egalitarianism, and attributions of blame for poverty. Like other analyses, however, this effort failed to resolve fully an important difficulty in dealing with this topic: the substantial overlap in the public mind between "African Americans" and "poor Americans." Blacks compose a disproportionate share of the poor in the United States (currently about 28%; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995). More to the point, the public *thinks* that blacks make up an even larger share of the poor. In one national survey, respondents were asked: "Of all the people who are poor in this country, are more of them

[1] In 1990, approximately $42 billion was spent on AFDC, Food Stamps, and General Assistance by all levels of government. This constituted about 7% of the $613 billion spent on social welfare. Total social welfare spending includes social insurance ($419 billion alone), health care, veterans' programs, education, housing, and public aid (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, tables 579, 583).

[2] For example, Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) find a standardized regression coefficient of −0.22 for the relationship between family income and support for welfare, while Kluegel and Smith (1986) find an analogous coefficient of −0.14.

[3] As have public opinion analyses, studies in political development also have neglected the role of race in shaping the U.S. welfare state. The most significant exceptions are Quadagno (1988, 1994) and Lieberman (1995).

[4] In addition to these analyses, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) conclude that racial attitudes are important in shaping white opinion toward "opportunity enhancing" policies, such as enterprise zones and educational spending, but relatively unimportant in shaping attitudes toward "equal outcomes" policies. Bobo and Kluegel did not use support for welfare as a measure of an equal outcome policy, however, but used instead the more ambiguous measures of "government efforts to improve the standard of living of the poor" and "government spending to assist the poor." (These could take many forms, including opportunity enhancement, such as job training). At any rate, Bobo and Kluegel focused on the differences between income-targeted versus race-targeted policies, not on the relative importance of different factors in shaping attitudes in any given policy domain.

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black or are more of them white?"[5] Fifty-one percent of respondents chose black, and only 17% white (the remainder said about equal or had no opinion). In the National Race and Politics Study analyzed below, respondents were simply asked: "What percent of all the poor people in this country would you say are black?" The median guess was 50%.[6]

One consequence of the overlap between black and poor in the public's thinking is that attitudes toward the poor are confounded with attitudes toward blacks. Thus, a key obstacle to confident assessment of the importance of racial views in shaping welfare attitudes is the ability to distinguish between these two sets of influences. Both must be included as independent variables in any analysis, and the measures employed must be as nearly parallel as possible.[7] In the research reported here, this is achieved by using a randomized survey-based experiment to disentangle whites' attitudes toward blacks and toward the poor.

The major hypothesized influences on welfare views consist of economic self-interest, individualism, racial attitudes, and attitudes toward the poor in general. But two additional factors may shape welfare attitudes. First, partisan identification has long been recognized as an important influence on political policy preferences, and previous research has shown that Republicans express greater opposition to welfare than do Democrats (Cook and Barrett 1992). Similarly, conservatives are more likely to oppose welfare than are liberals (Cook and Barrett 1992). Consequently, both partisanship and ideological self-identification are taken into account in examining welfare views.

DATA AND METHODS

The data analyzed here come from the 1991 National Race and Politics Study, a nationwide random-digit telephone survey directed by Paul M. Sniderman, Philip E. Tetlock, and Thomas Piazza and conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of California at Berkeley. The survey produced 2,223 completed interviews, with a response rate of 65.3%. In addition, a mailback questionnaire was obtained from 1,198 of those respondents who completed telephone interviews. The response rate for the mailback portion of the study was 35.2% of the total eligible sample units and 53.9% of those completing the telephone interview.[8]

Nonresponse analysis was conducted to assess the degree to which the mailback sample was representative of the full study sample. No differences were found on any of the attitude variables used in this research. The samples do differ somewhat in income and education, but these small differences are further reduced when the appropriate sample weights are applied. (See Appendix B for comparisons of sample and population demographics.)

Black respondents are excluded from all the analyses presented below because racial attitudes clearly play different roles in shaping policy preferences among blacks and nonblacks. Separate analyses would be necessary to understand the welfare attitudes of blacks, which would be impossible with only 201 black respondents to the telephone survey. (For analyses of blacks' welfare attitudes, see Sigelman and Welch 1991 and Gilliam and Whitby 1989.) This analysis, then, will draw upon the 2,022 nonblack respondents to the telephone survey and the subsample of 1,137 nonblacks who also completed the mailback questionnaire.

As in previous research, economic self-interest will be measured by family income. Although commonly used as an indicator of self-interest, income is clearly not an ideal measure. First, income represents only a "snapshot" of a respondent's economic status; recent changes in income or future expectations may be more directly tied to perceptions about potential benefits from welfare or burdens from taxes. Second, income represents an objective measure of a respondent's social condition but does not directly tap his or her *perceptions* of the potential personal economic costs and benefits of welfare or the likelihood that those costs or benefits will be realized. Despite these limitations, family income has been shown to be the best objective measure of economic condition for the purpose of assessing welfare views (Gilens 1995b) and is virtually the only such measure used in previous studies of this topic (Cook and Barrett 1992 provide the lone exception).[9]

Individualism concerns the proper balance of personal and government responsibility and was measured quite straightforwardly in the survey by the following question: "The government in Washington tries to do too many things that should be left up to individuals and private businesses." Responses were expressed on a four-point agree/disagree scale. (The full question wording, means, and standard deviations for all variables are found in Appendix A.)

Perceptions of blacks as lazy are assessed by the difference in respondents' scores on two items from a series of personal characteristics applied to blacks. The series is introduced as follows:

> Now I'll read a few words that people sometimes use to describe blacks. Of course, no word fits absolutely everybody, but, as I read each one, please tell me using a number

[5] CBS/New York Times Survey, March 1982.

[6] It appears that Americans also exaggerate the proportion of blacks among the general population. A Gallup survey asked: "What percent of the American population today would you say is black?" The median response was about 32% (Gallup Poll, March 15–18, 1990). To some extent, then, the perception that blacks constitute half or more of America's poor may reflect this more general misperception about the number of blacks in the United States.

[7] If the measures employed tap different dimensions of attitudes toward blacks and toward the poor, or if they elicit different response characteristics due to differing question wording or formats, then they may not fully satisfy their role as control variables for each other.

[8] Because many of the survey items of interest here (including the questions composing the welfare attitudes index) are from the mailback questionnaire, the analyses are often limited to the 1,198 respondents who completed it. Separate weights were developed by the Survey Research Center for analyses based on the mailback sample, to permit greater confidence in generalizing from this sample.

[9] In addition to these considerations, the use of a single continuous variable to measure income in a regression analysis reflects only its *linear* relationship with welfare attitudes. Other analyses, however, have shown that allowing for a nonlinear relationship does not increase the power of income as a predictor of welfare views (Gilens 1995b).

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from 0 to 10 how well you think it describes blacks as a group. If you think it's a very good description of most blacks, give it a 10. If you feel a word is a very inaccurate description of most blacks, give it a 0.

The measure of blacks as lazy was constructed by subtracting a respondent's score for "hardworking" from his or her score for "lazy."[10]

Two questions tapped perceptions of the work ethic of the poor. The first asked: "Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy." Responses were given on a four-point agree/disagree scale. The second asked whether most poor people are poor because "they don't try hard enough to get ahead" or because "they don't get the training and education they need."[11]

Partisanship was measured with the standard seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican, while liberal/conservative self-placement consisted of three categories—liberal, conservative, and either moderate or "haven't thought much about it." Educational attainment was measured on a six-point scale, ranging from "eighth grade or lower" to "some graduate work or graduate degree," and age was measured in years.

Respondents' welfare views were measured by (1) a single variable asking whether federal spending for welfare should be increased, decreased, or kept the same and (2) an index of four agree/disagree questions measuring respondents' attitudes toward welfare (see Appendix A for full text).[12] The first of these measures had a more economic focus and indicated respondents' policy preferences with regard to welfare expenditures, while the latter reflected how positively or negatively they viewed welfare in the abstract and welfare recipients in particular. Employing these two alternative measures allowed confirmation of the basic findings concerning race and helped interpret some of the other dynamics of public attitudes toward welfare.[13]

Like most previous analyses of welfare attitudes, the statistical models used here indicate the effect of each predictor variable net of all the other predictors in the model. Such models reflect only the direct effect of each independent variable, and not any influence that may be channeled through other independent variables in the model. As is often the case, however, many of the predictor variables used here may plausibly be considered endogenous: Beliefs about blacks, beliefs about the poor, ideology, partisan identification, and individualism may be influences on, and influenced by, one another. Any causal relationships among the predictors would imply that the independent variables may have both a direct effect on welfare views (which the model captures) and an indirect effect channeled through the other predictors (which the model does not capture).

Because the causal relationships among the predictor variables are ambiguous, it is impossible to assess fully the magnitude of any indirect effects. For example, the association of liberal/conservative ideology and racial views may reflect the influence of each upon the other. Without knowing the causal direction of this relationship it is impossible to determine whether (and to what extent) ideology has an indirect effect on welfare attitudes channeled through racial views, or racial views have an indirect effect on welfare attitudes channeled through ideology. By ignoring such indirect effects, the models below avoid improperly crediting an independent variable with a larger total effect than is warranted. At the same time, the direct effects reported below must be considered estimates of the minimum influence of each predictor on welfare attitudes, with the possibility that the total effect (i.e., direct plus indirect effects) could be larger.

Although causally ambiguous relationships among predictor variables are often found in cross-sectional survey analyses, unmeasured indirect effects only become problematic to the degree that the predictor variables are strongly associated with one another. If these associations are weak, then any indirect effects also must be weak. In the analyses reported below, the correlations among the predictors are low enough that indirect effects are not likely to alter the results significantly.[14]

FINDINGS

I first estimate a conventional structural model of welfare views. This model resembles those found in earlier research (e.g., Cook and Barrett 1992, Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Kluegel and Smith 1986) but includes more adequate measures of racial attitudes. Table 1 shows OLS estimates for the following model:

$$W = a + b_1BL + b_2PL + b_3I + b_4F + b_5A + b_6P + b_7L + b_8E + e,$$

where W = welfare views, BL = belief that blacks are lazy, PL = belief that poor people are lazy, I = individualism, F = family income, A = age, P = partisan identification, L = liberal/conservative self-placement, and E = education. For these analyses, welfare views are scored from −1 for the most negative attitudes to +1 for

[10] Cronbach's alpha for the scale measuring perceptions of blacks as lazy was 0.35. Blacks were the only group asked about. The full list of characteristics (in the order asked) was: dependable, intelligent in school, aggressive or violent, lazy, smart with everyday things, law abiding, boastful, determined to succeed, hardworking, friendly, irresponsible, keep up property, complaining, and good neighbors. Of these characteristics, "lazy" and "hardworking" were chosen to measure perceptions of blacks' commitment to the work ethic both because of their face validity and because these terms are the negative and positive characteristics most strongly associated with respondents' preferences on welfare spending and with their welfare attitudes.

[11] Cronbach's alpha for the scale measuring perceptions of the work ethic of the poor was 0.38.

[12] Cronbach's alpha for the welfare attitudes scale was 0.61.

[13] Geographical region also was examined (using the National Election Study's standard four-region classification). Based on an F-test for the full set of region variables, region was found to be nonsignificant as a predictor of the three dependent variables used below. Consequently, region was dropped from the analysis.

[14] The matrix of 28 correlations among the eight predictors shown in Table 1 reveals only three correlations above 0.15 (education and income are correlated at 0.37, partisanship and ideology at 0.22, and education and racial attitudes at 0.21).

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TABLE 1. Predictors of Whites' Welfare Spending Preferences and Welfare Attitudes

	Welfare Spending			Welfare Attitudes		
	b	(standard error)	*p*	*b*	(standard error)	*p*
b_1 Blacks are lazy	−.67	(.13)	<.001	−.55	(.06)	<.001
b_2 Poor people are lazy	−.47	(.10)	<.001	−.31	(.04)	<.001
b_3 Individualism	−.29	(.08)	<.001	−.22	(.04)	<.001
b_4 Family income	−.28	(.08)	.001	−.01	(.04)	ns
b_5 Age	−.30	(.11)	.004	.06	(.05)	ns
b_6 Party identification (high = Democratic)	.17	(.05)	<.001	.04	(.02)	ns
b_7 Liberal/conservative (high = liberal)	.10	(.06)	ns	.09	(.03)	.001
b_8 Education	.04	(.11)	ns	.11	(.05)	.030
R^2		.11			.22	
N		1017			1011	

ns = not significant

Note: All independent variables are recoded to a range of 0 to 1. "Welfare spending" and "welfare attitudes" are scored from −1 for most negative views to +1 for most positive views. (See Appendix A for question wording and index construction.)

Source: All data are from the National Race and Politics Study telephone survey except for the "welfare attitudes" and "poor people are lazy" indices, which are from the mailback questionnaire to the National Race and Politics Study.

the most positive, and all predictor variables are rescored to a 0–to–1 scale.[15]

With regard to both welfare spending preferences and the welfare attitudes index, the results in Table 1 show that racial attitudes strongly influence whites' welfare views. Whites who fully accepted the view of blacks as lazy had predicted scores on welfare spending that were 0.67 units lower than whites who fully rejected this view. This same difference in racial attitudes was associated with a unit change of 0.55 in score on the welfare attitudes index.

After racial attitudes, the predictor with the strongest relationship to welfare views was the belief that poor people are lazy. A one-unit change in respondents' perception of the work ethic of the poor was associated with a unit change of 0.47 in welfare spending preferences and of 0.31 in the welfare attitudes index. Individualism was more weakly associated with welfare views. A one-unit change in individualism (from strong disagreement to strong agreement) was associated with a unit change of 0.29 in welfare spending preference and of 0.22 in the welfare attitudes index.

Economic self-interest, as measured by higher family income, was associated with greater opposition to welfare spending but was not related to the welfare attitudes index. This difference supports the validity of income as an indicator of economic self-interest, as it appears that whites with higher incomes (and therefore higher taxes) do not hold more negative views of welfare or welfare recipients, but nevertheless they are more likely to favor cuts in welfare spending. Even with regard to welfare spending, however, the effect of family income was only moderate: A difference of $60,000 in income (between the lowest and the highest categories) was associated with a unit difference of 0.28 in welfare spending.

Among the hypothesized sources of opposition to welfare, the perception that blacks are lazy was clearly the most important, followed by perceptions of poor people and individualist opposition to government activity in general. Economic self-interest was an important influence on welfare spending preferences but was unrelated to welfare attitudes more generally. In addition to these four influences on welfare views, it was found that older respondents were more opposed to welfare spending but did not differ in their scores on the welfare attitudes index. This suggests that age influences welfare policy preferences not because older whites hold different attitudes toward the poor but because they see their self-interest as better served by cutting welfare spending.

The remaining independent variables in Table 1 are more remarkable for their *lack* of association with welfare views. For example, although the relationship of party identification with welfare spending preferences was statistically significant, the association was quite weak; strong Democrats were only 0.17 units more supportive of welfare spending than were strong Republicans. Similarly, liberals were only 0.10 units higher on the welfare spending measure than were conservatives. Opposition to welfare, it seems, cuts across partisan and ideological lines, turning instead on beliefs about the character of blacks and of poor people, commitment to individualism, and perceptions of economic self-interest.[16]

Thus far, we have seen that whites' welfare views were strongly influenced by their perceptions of blacks, and thus the popular belief that welfare is a "race coded" issue appears warranted. Whatever other reasons whites may have for opposing welfare, their negative views of blacks appear to constitute an important factor in generating that opposition.

It is, perhaps, no great shock to find that the belief

[15] Predictor variables were rescored via a linear transformation. For each variable, a constant was subtracted from all scores so that the lowest category equaled zero; the scores then were divided by the range for that variable.

[16] The effects of partisanship and ideology were weak not only in the multivariate models in Table 1 but also at the zero-order. Thus, the lack of a strong relationship between these variables and welfare views is not due to their collinearity or to their indirect effects on welfare views.

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that blacks are lazy can generate opposition to welfare among whites. But two things must be kept in mind to appreciate fully the importance of this finding. First, it was not poor blacks, or blacks on welfare, who were asked about; respondents were instructed to indicate how well "lazy" and "hardworking" describe *most blacks*. This suggests not only that whites' evaluations of welfare are steeped in racial considerations but also that the relevant racial views are not limited to perceptions of poor blacks or blacks on welfare but extend to the much broader category of American blacks in general.[17]

The second thing to keep in mind is that the influence of racial views on welfare support is even stronger than the effect of views about the poor in general. Remarkably, whites' perceptions of blacks as lazy appear more important in shaping opposition to welfare than do their perceptions of poor people as lazy. Once again, this suggests that the welfare debate has become so racialized that what matters most to the white public is perceptions of a single subgroup of welfare recipients—blacks. Although 63% of current welfare recipients are nonblack (U.S. House of Representatives 1994), beliefs about blacks appear to dominate whites' thinking when it comes to evaluating welfare.

MEASURING RACIAL ATTITUDES WITH A SURVEY-BASED EXPERIMENT

While the findings in Table 1 are dramatic, one shortcoming in the data limits our confidence in the results: Perceptions of the work ethic of blacks and of the poor were not assessed with identical questions. In the first case, respondents were asked to rate the applicability of "lazy" and "hardworking" to "most blacks"; in the second case, questions asked whether "most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy" and whether most poor people are poor because "they don't try hard enough to get ahead" or because "they don't get the training and education they need."

Although these questions appear to be valid measures of perceptions of blacks and of the poor, we would prefer to have strictly identical measures to assess their relative importance in shaping welfare attitudes. Unfortunately, respondents cannot simply be asked to evaluate both blacks and poor people using the same questions due to consistency pressures that exist within the survey setting (Schuman and Presser 1981). Because social norms of equality apply to racial issues, respondents may feel pressured to provide the same response to questions about blacks and about whites. Thus, if white respondents acknowledge their belief that black welfare recipients are lazy, on a subsequent question they face a pressure to say that white welfare recipients are lazy as well. Alternatively, if they first indicate that whites on welfare would prefer to be working, they may feel pressured to respond that black welfare recipients would rather be working, too. An apparent example of such consistency pressures with regard to racial attitudes comes from a recent national telephone survey in which respondents were asked to indicate how "warm" or "cold" they felt toward nine different social groups on a "feeling thermometer" of 0 to 100 points. Fully 67% gave *exactly the same score* to blacks and whites on this 100-point scale.[18]

In order to overcome the consistency pressures inherent in asking the same respondents to evaluate poor blacks and poor whites using identical questions, I employed an experimental manipulation whereby half the respondents were asked only about blacks and the other half an identical question with reference to whites. Because each respondent was asked only about one racial group, consistency pressures were absent. If white respondents' thinking about poverty and welfare is dominated by their images and evaluations of blacks, then we would expect the black version of this experimental question to be more strongly related to overall welfare views than the white version. By means of this experiment we can reveal something of the thought process or judgmental heuristic (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) respondents use in evaluating welfare. When whites assess welfare in general, or identify their preferences with regard to welfare spending, are they thinking more about black welfare recipients, white welfare recipients, or both equally?

Use of this technique combined the advantages of the randomized experiment with those of the sample survey (see Piazza, Sniderman, and Tetlock 1989). Randomly assigning respondents to question "treatments" ensured that differences in responses resulted from differences in the questions asked, and since the random assignment was uncorrelated with respondents' characteristics, we need not worry that differences in responses to poor blacks and poor whites would be confounded with other factors, such as income, education, or political attitudes. By embedding this experiment in a large-scale national survey, we also retained the ability to generalize to the U.S. population, an ability that is severely limited in the typical small-scale experiment.

In the "welfare mother" experiment, respondents were asked their impressions of a welfare recipient described as either a black or white woman in her early 30s, who has a ten-year-old child, and who has been on welfare for the past year.[19] Respondents were asked, first, how likely it is that the woman described will try hard to find a job and, second, how likely it is that she will have more children to get a larger welfare check (see Appendix A for question wording). For this analysis, the responses to the two questions are combined into an index of beliefs about welfare mothers,[20] with those who said it is very unlikely that the welfare mother will look

[17] Poor blacks constitute about 33% of all American blacks; blacks receiving AFDC make up 23% of all black families (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, 1995; U.S. House of Representatives 1994).

[18] These data are from the 1994 Multi-Investigator Study directed by Paul M. Sniderman, Henry E. Brady, and Philip E. Tetlock and conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of California at Berkeley, with support from the National Science Foundation (SBR 9309946). This random-digit telephone survey of the United States had 1,464 cases and a response rate of 65.5%.

[19] For half the respondents, the welfare mother was described as a high school dropout, for the other half as a high school graduate. In the current analysis, these two versions of the question are combined.

[20] Cronbach's alpha for the welfare mother index was .61.

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TABLE 2. Beliefs about Black and White Welfare Mothers as Predictors of Whites' Welfare Views

	Welfare Spending			Welfare Attitudes			Poor People Are Lazy		
	b	(standard error)	*p*	*b*	(standard error)	*p*	*b*	(standard error)	*p*
b_1 Perceptions of welfare mothers	.46	(.07)	<.001	.38	(.04)	<.001	.23	(.06)	<.001
b_2 Race of welfare mother	.01	(.04)	ns	.04	(.02)	ns	.01	(.03)	ns
b_3 Interaction: perceptions × race	.28	(.13)	.040	.21	(.08)	.010	.21	(.11)	.050
b_4 Family income	−.26	(.06)	<.001	.04	(.04)	ns	−.15	(.05)	.005
b_5 Individualism	−.22	(.06)	<.001	−.24	(.04)	<.001	−.21	(.05)	<.001
b_6 Age	−.25	(.08)	.001	−.07	(.05)	ns	.08	(.07)	ns
b_7 Party identification (high = Democratic)	.17	(.04)	<.001	.07	(.02)	.001	.07	(.03)	.02
b_8 Liberal/conservative (high = liberal)	.14	(.04)	.001	.12	(.03)	<.001	.11	(.04)	.004
b_9 Education	.10	(.08)	ns	.15	(.05)	.001	.16	(.07)	.020
R^2		.07			.18			.07	
N		1913			1107			1100	

ns = not significant

Note: All independent variables are recoded to a range of 0 to 1, except perceptions of welfare mothers and race of welfare mother, which are coded −0.5 to +0.5. "Welfare spending," "welfare attitudes," and "poor people are lazy" are all scored from −1 for the most negative attitudes toward poverty and welfare to +1 for the most positive attitudes. See Appendix A for question wording and index construction. The larger sample size for the "welfare spending" model is due to the inclusion of only variables from the telephone survey.

Source: All data are from the National Race and Politics Study telephone survey except for the "welfare attitudes" and "poor people are lazy" indices, which are from the mailback questionnaire to the Race and Politics survey.

for a job and very likely that she will have more children receiving the lowest scores.

To assess the relative importance of perceptions of black and white welfare mothers, I reestimated the models shown in Table 1 using responses to the welfare mother experiment in place of the measures of attitudes toward blacks and toward the poor.[21] (I also applied this same model to the belief that poor people are lazy, which was used as an independent variable in Table 1.) Our interest in these analyses is the interaction between respondents' perceptions of welfare mothers and the manipulated race of the welfare mother in question. That is, does identifying the welfare mother as black increase the relationship between the associated perception and whites' welfare attitudes and welfare policy preferences? To answer this question I estimated the following model:

$$W = a + b_1M + b_2R + b_3(M^*R) + b_4F + b_5I + b_6A + b_7P + b_8L + b_9E + e,$$

where W = welfare views, M = perceptions of welfare mothers, R = race of the welfare mother in question, F = family income, I = individualism, A = age, P = partisan identification, L = liberal/conservative self-placement, and E = education.

Interaction terms in multiple regression (such as M*R above) are often highly collinear with their component variables, resulting in large standard errors and low significance levels. The standard remedy for this condition is to "center" the component variables about their means before constructing the interaction term (Cronbach 1987; Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan 1990). This centering reduces the standard errors but does not affect the magnitude of the interaction coefficient or of the calculated slopes for the component variables (in this case, the influence of perceptions of black and white welfare mothers).

Following this procedure, perceptions of welfare mothers were scored from −0.5 for the most negative views to +0.5 for the most positive, and the race of the welfare mother in question was scored −0.5 for whites and +0.5 for blacks. Of particular interest is the coefficient for the interaction term, b_3. If respondents are thinking more about black welfare mothers when they offer their overall views of welfare, then we would expect the black version of the welfare mother experiment to be more strongly related to welfare views than the white version, and b_3 will be positive. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case; in all three models of welfare views, b_3 is positive in sign and statistically significant.

In order to assess the difference in effect of perceptions of black and white welfare mothers, I next calculated the estimated effect of welfare mother perceptions for respondents assigned to the "black" and "white" treatment conditions. For the white treatment condition, this effect was calculated as:

$$b_{\text{white}} = b_1 + b_3(-0.5);$$

for the black condition the analogous calculation was:

$$b_{\text{black}} = b_1 + b_3(0.5).$$

These results (shown in Table 3) indicate that the influence of beliefs about welfare mothers is about twice as strong when she is black than when she is white. For example, a one-unit change in beliefs about white wel-

[21] The analyses in Table 2 do not include the "blacks are lazy" and "poor people are lazy" indices from Table 1 because they are alternative measures of the same underlying views about the commitment to the work ethic of poor blacks and nonblacks that the welfare mother questions are designed to tap.

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TABLE 3. Effect of Beliefs about Black and White Welfare Mothers on Whites' Welfare Views

	Welfare Spending	Welfare Attitudes	Poor People Are Lazy
Perceptions about white welfare mothers	.32	.28	.13
Perceptions about black welfare mothers	.60	.49	.34

Note: Table entries indicate the effect of a one-unit change in perceptions of welfare mothers (scored −0.5 to +0.5) on whites' welfare views (scored −1 to +1), holding constant the other variables in Table 2. Entries are calculated from results in Table 2 as follows: For white welfare mothers entries above = $b_1 + (-0.5)(b_3)$; for black welfare mothers entries above = $b_1 + (0.5)(b_3)$.

fare mothers (i.e., from the most negative to the most positive views) is associated with a unit increase of 0.32 in support for welfare spending; the same one-unit change in perceptions of black welfare mothers is associated with a unit increase of 0.60. Similarly, in predicting both the welfare attitudes index and the belief that poor people are lazy, we find that white respondents' views of white welfare mothers have a much smaller effect than do their views of black welfare mothers. These differences in the influence of the black and white versions of the welfare mother question are both large and consistent across the three different measures of attitudes toward welfare and toward the poor. Using strictly parallel questions, it is clear that whites consider black welfare recipients much more strongly than white welfare recipients when evaluating welfare.

The dramatic differences in the effect of perceptions of black and white welfare mothers indicate that the widespread intuition about the "race-coded" nature of contemporary welfare politics is correct; white Americans' welfare views are clearly not "race-neutral" expressions of their economic self-interest, commitment to individualism, or evaluations of poor people in general. Instead, those views are strongly rooted in their beliefs about blacks, and particularly their perceptions of black welfare recipients.

Before fully accepting the findings in tables 2 and 3, however, we must examine the possibility that the greater predictive power of the black version of the welfare mother experiment could result from differences in the distribution of attitudes in response to the two different versions. In fact, however, the distribution of responses to the two versions was remarkably similar. With the welfare mother perception index scored −0.5 for the most negative views and +0.5 for the most positive views, the black and white versions of this index had means of −0.07 and −0.05, respectively, with standard deviations of 0.258 and 0.261. When black and white welfare mothers were described in similar terms, white respondents made nearly identical evaluations.[22]

The "racialization" of welfare as a political issue has implications for both the character of electoral campaigns and the complexion of U.S. race relations. But does whites' tendency to focus primarily on black welfare recipients also generate greater opposition to welfare? It may appear from whites' similar perceptions of white and black welfare mothers that this is not the case. After all, if they view white welfare mothers just as negatively as black welfare mothers, it may not matter that whites' welfare attitudes are dominated by their views of blacks, at least as far as their welfare policy preferences are concerned.

But the similarity of whites' evaluations of black and white welfare mothers does not mean that racial considerations do not affect support for welfare; the *consequences* of holding negative beliefs about black and white welfare mothers are not the same. Figure 1 shows that, as expected, respondents with negative perceptions of welfare mothers expressed more opposition to welfare than did those with positive views, but there is a racial asymmetry apparent in this figure. The welfare attitudes of white respondents with positive views of black welfare mothers were the same as those with positive views of white welfare mothers (0.09 versus 0.10; $p = ns$), and the welfare attitudes of those with neutral perceptions of black and white welfare mothers were the same (0.01 versus −0.03; $p = ns$). Yet, negative beliefs about black welfare mothers were associated with significantly more negative views of welfare in general than were negative beliefs about white welfare mothers (−0.25 versus −0.10; $p < 0.001$).

Whether whites base their evaluations of welfare on their images of black or white welfare recipients does matter, *both* because a racially charged welfare debate has important implications for the character of U.S. politics *and* because whites' negative evaluations of black welfare recipients appear to generate greater opposition to welfare. As Figure 1 reveals, holding negative perceptions of white welfare mothers leads to increased opposition to welfare among whites, but the increase is modest; holding negative views of black welfare mothers, in contrast, leads to a substantial increase in opposition.

We saw above that racial attitudes figured prominently in whites' evaluations of welfare and that perceptions of black welfare mothers were stronger influences on welfare views than were perceptions of white welfare mothers. Figure 1 reveals just why this is so. The greater power of beliefs about black welfare mothers in shaping white respondents' welfare views comes from the particular salience of *negative* images of blacks.

[22] On balance, white respondents expressed only slightly negative views of black and white welfare mothers. The lack of a more negative response may reflect the description of the welfare mother in this experiment: She is 30 years old, has one ten-year-old child, and has been on welfare for only one year. In addition, for a random half of the respondents, the welfare mother is described as being a high school graduate (see footnote 19). This hypothetical welfare mother is in fact older, has fewer children, and has been on welfare for a shorter time than the average current AFDC recipient (U.S. House of Representatives 1994).

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FIGURE 1. Welfare Attitudes of Whites, by Perceptions of Black and White Welfare Mothers



Source: Welfare mother stereotypes are from the National Race and Politics Study telephone survey; the welfare attitudes index is from the mailback questionnaire to the National Race and Politics Study.

CONCLUSION

This article examined a simple but important question: Do white Americans' racial attitudes significantly shape the positions they hold on ostensibly race-neutral social policies such as crime, welfare, immigration, and illegal drugs? Do these issues—as many suspect—engage whites' dislike, resentment, or fear of blacks? We looked only at whites' attitudes toward welfare, and we cannot extend these findings to the other issues in this domain. But with regard to welfare, the answer is clear: Racial attitudes are a powerful influence on white Americans' welfare views. Indeed, the analyses reported here suggest that racial considerations are the single most important factor shaping whites' views of welfare.

The dramatic effect of racial attitudes on welfare views should not be taken to mean that other factors are absent. On the contrary, this analysis indicates that beliefs about the nonblack poor as well as individualism, partisan identification, liberal/conservative ideology, age, income, and education all influence whites' thinking about welfare. Nor should the association between racial attitudes and welfare views be understood apart from its historical context. Just as Americans now associate poverty with blacks, other social groups appear to have dominated public thinking about the poor in other historical periods. During the 19th century, Irish immigrants were viewed as shiftless, drunken, and happy to live off handouts (Harrington 1984), while in the early 1960s a more sympathetic poverty discourse arose focusing on the white poor of Appalachia (Katz 1989).

To some degree these shifts follow the demographic changes in U.S. poverty. Currently, blacks are substantially overrepresented among America's poor, and this is clearly an important element in the public's association of race and poverty. But blacks in this country have always been disproportionately poor. In the early 1960s, when poverty was more associated with rural whites than urban blacks, blacks were even more overrepresented among the poor (and among welfare recipients) than they are today.[23] Furthermore, while blacks account for

[23] In 1960 blacks accounted for 26% of poor people, 2.5 times their proportion of the U.S. population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, 469; 1995, 14). Blacks now account for 28% of the poor, or 2.2 times their proportion of the population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995, 480, 14). Similarly, in 1960 blacks constituted 40% of AFDC recipients, 3.8 times their proportion of the population (Piven and Cloward 1993,

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a disproportionate number of welfare recipients, they exert an even more disproportionate influence on white Americans' welfare views. Although there are more whites among welfare recipients than there are blacks,[24] beliefs about blacks in general, and black welfare mothers in particular, are substantially more important in shaping whites' welfare views than are beliefs about the poor or perceptions of white welfare mothers. Thus, the demographics of poverty cannot fully account for whites' tendency to think about welfare in racial terms. Instead, this tendency must be understood as the product of a particular social and cultural context within which blacks' overrepresentation among the poor acquires an exaggerated salience for white Americans.

Welfare spending represents a small fraction of all government spending, but its symbolic power far exceeds its fiscal importance. Debates over welfare, and promises of reform, have figured prominently in recent presidential campaigns and appear destined to play an important role in national politics. The analyses above suggest that the symbolic power of welfare as a political issue stems in large measure from its racial undertones.

This finding has troubling implications for electoral politics. When crime or welfare become vehicles with which to mobilize and stimulate antiblack sentiments among the white electorate, we face an insidious politics of racial division. School integration and affirmative action are also difficult and divisive issues, but in those cases the racial component is explicit. While discussion of these issues can be painful, racial claims can be challenged, and debate can be subjected to the norms of "civilized discourse." But "race-coded" issues are attractive to some politicians precisely because they can exploit the power of racial suspicion and animosity while insulating themselves from charges of race-baiting.[25]

When explicit claims about race are made, they can be rebutted; but when blacks are linked with crime, welfare, or drug use only implicitly, such links are less likely to be challenged. Thus, a subterranean discourse on race in U.S. society emerges, based largely on misleading images and chosen to influence voters by inciting fear or indignation. Rarely does one hear public figures make the explicit claim that irresponsible black mothers are the "problem" with welfare or that violence-prone black men are the reason our streets are unsafe at night. But since they are not being made, such claims are not refuted. The public is left to draw its own conclusions, based on existing stereotypes and biased media coverage,[26] and the conclusions drawn are exactly what one would expect under such conditions.

Although blacks represent only 37% of welfare recipients, perceptions of black welfare mothers dominate whites' evaluations of welfare and their preferences with regard to welfare spending. Thus, the "unspoken agenda" of racial imagery appears to be more important in shaping public understanding of welfare than are explicit debates over welfare reform that are cast in race-neutral language.

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS AND INDEX CONSTRUCTION

Welfare spending (range = −1 to +1; mean = −0.30; standard deviation = 0.77)
Suppose you had a say in making up the federal budget, would you prefer to see more spent, less spent, or the same amount of money spent on welfare as it has been?
1 = More spent, 0 = Kept the same, −1 = Less spent

Welfare attitudes (range = −1 to +1; mean = −0.05; standard deviation = 0.37)
Scale = (WA1 + WA2 − WA3 − WA4)/6

WA1. Most people on welfare could get by without it if they really tried.
1 = Agree strongly, 2 = Agree somewhat, 3 = Disagree somewhat, 4 = Disagree strongly
(mean = 2.33; standard deviation = 0.84)

WA2. The high cost of welfare puts too big a burden on the average taxpayer.
1 = Agree strongly, 2 = Agree somewhat, 3 = Disagree somewhat, 4 = Disagree strongly
(mean = 1.74; standard deviation = 0.76)

WA3. When people can't support themselves, the government should help by giving them enough money to meet their basic needs.
1 = Agree strongly, 2 = Agree somewhat, 3 = Disagree somewhat, 4 = Disagree strongly
(mean = 1.96; standard deviation = 0.80)

WA4. Most people on welfare would rather be working than taking money from the government.
1 = Agree strongly, 2 = Agree somewhat, 3 = Disagree somewhat, 4 = Disagree strongly
(mean = 2.45; standard deviation = 0.88)

Blacks are lazy (range = 0 to 1; mean = 0.45; standard deviation = 0.18)
Scale = (BL1 − BL2 + 10)/20
Now I'll read a few words that people sometimes use to describe blacks. Of course, no word fits absolutely everybody, but, as I read each one, please tell me using a number from 0 to 10 how well you think it describes blacks as a group. If you think it's a very good description of most blacks, give it a 10. If you feel a word is a very inaccurate description of most blacks, give it a 0.

BL1. Lazy (mean = 5.01; standard deviation = 2.57)

BL2. Hardworking (mean = 6.02; standard deviation = 2.11)

Poor people are lazy (range = 0 to 1; mean = 0.32; standard deviation = 0.25)
Scale = (PL1 − PL2 + 3)/6

PL1. What do you think makes most poor people poor? Most of them are poor because . . .
1 = They don't get the training and education they need; 2.5 = Both statements are wrong; 4 = They don't try hard enough to get ahead
(mean = 1.68; standard deviation = 1.08)

PL2. Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy.
1 = Agree strongly, 2 = Agree somewhat, 3 = Disagree somewhat, 4 = Disagree strongly
(mean = 2.78; standard deviation = 0.79)

Welfare mother perceptions (range = 0 to 1; mean = 0.44; standard deviation = 0.26)
Scale = (WM1 − WM2 + 6)/12

194; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995, 14). Today blacks make up 37% of AFDC recipients, 3 times their population proportion (U.S. House of Representatives 1994, 402; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995, 14).

[24] Thirty-seven percent of AFDC families are headed by blacks, compared with 39% headed by non-Hispanic whites and 55% by Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites combined (U.S. House of Representatives 1994).

[25] If done too crudely, such strategies risk being "exposed," just as the Willie Horton advertisement evoked outrage and charges of race-baiting from Democrats (and others). Whether this outrage diminished the ad's effectiveness is uncertain (see Mendelberg 1994).

[26] For evidence of racial bias in media coverage, see Gilens (1995a) on poverty and welfare and Entman (1992) on crime.

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Now think about a (black/white) woman in her early thirties. She is a high school (graduate/drop out) with a ten-year-old child, and she has been on welfare for the past year.

WM1. How likely is it that she will have more children in order to get a bigger welfare check?
1 = Very likely, 3 = Somewhat likely, 5 = Somewhat unlikely, 7 = Not at all likely
(mean = 3.31; standard deviation = 1.83)

WM2. How likely do you think it is that she will really try hard to find a job in the next year?
1 = Very likely, 3 = Somewhat likely, 5 = Somewhat unlikely, 7 = Not at all likely
(mean = 4; standard deviation = 1.84)

Individualism (mean = 5.12; standard deviation = 1.69)
The government in Washington tries to do too many things that should be left up to individuals and private businesses.
1 = Disagree strongly, 3 = Disagree somewhat, 5 = Agree somewhat, 7 = Agree strongly

Family income (mean = 7.30; standard deviation = 3.63)
Think of the income BEFORE taxes of all members of your household living with you now.
Include income from all sources, including wages, dividends, interest, pensions, and other sources.
Responses coded in 13 categories from less than $10,000 (1) to more than $70,000 (13)

Age (mean = 43.4; standard deviation = 17.2)

Partisan identification (mean = 3.96; standard deviation = 1.94)
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?
Responses coded in 7 categories from Strong Republican (1) to Strong Democrat (7)

Liberal/conservative self-placement (mean = 1.80; standard deviation = 0.81)
Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought much about this?
1 = Conservative or more like a conservative, 2 = Moderate or haven't thought much, 3 = Liberal or more like a liberal

Education (mean = 3.48; standard deviation = 1.21)
What is the highest grade or year of school you completed?
1 = Eighth grade or lower, 2 = Some high school, 3 = High school graduate (or GED), 4 = Some college, 5 = College graduate, 6 = Some graduate work or graduate degree

APPENDIX B: SAMPLE AND POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

In most respects both the full telephone sample and the mailback subsample closely resemble the U.S. population (see Table B). The raw survey data show women and young people to be slightly underrepresented in both samples, while those with no college education are substantially underrepresented. In both samples, the median income is slightly higher than that of the U.S. population. The Survey Research Center constructed sample weights reflecting the number of eligible adults in each household, the number of telephone numbers in each household, and respondents' sex, race, age, and education. As shown below, the weighted data (used for all analyses in this article) closely match the U.S. population in all respects.

TABLE B. Sample and Population Characteristics

		Full Sample		Mailback Sample	
	Population Data	Raw	Weighted	Raw	Weighted
Age					
18 to 34	37.0%	36.4%	37.3%	33.6%	35.9%
35 to 49	28.5	33.2	29.4	34.0	30.3
50+	34.4	30.3	33.3	32.5	33.8
Sex					
Male	47.9%	44.8%	47.8%	42.2%	47.8%
Female	52.1	55.2	52.2	57.8	52.2
Education					
High school only	60.2%	45.0%	62.0%	40.4%	61.3%
Some college	18.4	25.7	18.3	26.0	19.2
College graduate	21.4	29.4	19.7	33.6	19.5
Median family income	$35,353	$36,225	$35,064	$37,922	$36,012

Sources: Age and sex: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, Table 14; Education: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, Table 220; Income: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995, Table 41.

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